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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERSELL HARRIS, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Case No. 
vs. 
13859 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden 
Utah State Prison 
Defendant-Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This case is an appeal from the denial of' 
a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Ersell 
Harris. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Petitioner filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial Distric 
Salt Lake County, Utah. The Honorable Peter F. Lea 
heard the argument, and denied petitioner's writ. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The petitioner asks the court to grant the 
frit of Habeas Corpus, thereby overruling the 
judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1967 petitioner Ersell Harris was charged 
tfith issuing a fictituous check. The State commen-
ced prosecution in the Third Judicial District 
Hourt, Salt Lake County, Utah, Case No. 20544. 
The complaint was subsequently dismissed on the 
motion of the prosecution. 
Three years later, in 197 0, the State once agai: 
brought charges against petitioner, such charges 
arising out of the same set of facts as the 1967 
information. This action was brought in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Case No. 22177. Petitioner was charged with 
uttering a fictituous check in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-26-1(1953), as amended. Petitioner 
was found guilty, and on or about September 29, 1970 
was sentenced to a term of 1-20 years by the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Honorable Merrill C. Faux. 
Petitioner appealed his conviction, and was 
released on bond pending the appeal. Approximately 
three years later, in a decision dated January 7, 
1974, the conviction was sustained on appeal by 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, Case 
No. 12424, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 (1974). 
Imposition of sentence followed the affirmance 
of the judgment of conviction, and petitioner 
is presently being held in the custody of the 
respondent in his capacity as Warden of the Utah 
State Prison. 
Effective as of July 1, 197 3, Utah adopted 
a new criminal code. Petitioner's appeal was 
pending at this time, and was not heard until 
six months after the effective date. Although 
the new criminal code was in effect at the time 
of the imposition of petitioner's sentence (January, 
1974), the penalty imposed upon petitioner was 
based on the statutory provision in force at the 
time of petitioner's conviction (September, 1970). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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POINT I 
THE COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST ERSELL HARRIS 
WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE IN THAT IT WAS IN-
VALID AND INSUFFICIENT ON ITS FACE AND 
DID NOT GIVE THE COURT OR THE DEFENDANT 
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF WHAT OFFENSE WAS IN-
TENDED TO BE CHARGED. 
A. THE COMPLAINT FILED AGAINST ERSELL HARRIS 
WAS INVALID AND INSUFFICIENT ON ITS FACE. 
In order to facilitate the job of the prosecutor 
md to insure criminal defendants fair and adequate 
lotice of the charge against them, the Utah Code 
)f Criminal Procedure has adopted standardized 
:orms for complaints. These standard forms, as 
collected in Utah Code Ann. §77-21-47(1953), indi-
cate what elements should be included in a criminal 
complaint before it is valid and sufficient on 
.ts face. 
The complaint filed against Ersell Harris 
^Complaint #18348, contained in the record) did 
Lot meet the standards set forth in the statute 
md was, therefore, defective and insufficient Digitized by the Howard W. Hunt r Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code Ann. §77-21-47(1953), supra., indicates 
that the words, "uttered a_s genuine a forged in-
strument," should be present when the offense of 
uttering a forged instrument is charged. In the 
Ersell Harris complaint, such words were omitted, 
as the complaint read as follows: 
That the said Ersell Harris, at the time 
and place aforesaid, did utter and pass a 
certain instrument, purporting to be a 
bank check, knowing the same to be forged, 
with the intent to defraud Buy-Rite, a cor-
poration. 
State v^ Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P.2d 949 
(1943), supports the above conclusion that, absent 
the words "uttered as genuine" the complaint was 
defective. In Jensen, the Court analyzed the 
statutory language found in Utah Code Ann. §105-
21-47 (1943), the predecessor statute to the present 
statute in question, Utah Code Ann. §77-21-47 (1953) 
The language in the two statutes was unchanged 
from the 1943 codification to the 1953 codifi-
cation. In discussing the statute, the Court 
indicated that the words "uttered as genuine" 
must be used in order to make the complaint suf-
ficient to invoke jurisdiction. Jensen at 955. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may co tain errors.
6 
Since such words were not used in the instant 
:ase, the complaint was invalid and insufficient 
:o invoke jurisdiction. 
B. THE INVALID AND INSUFFICIENT COMPLAINT 
FILED AGAINST HARRIS DID NOT GIVE THE 
COURT OR THE DEFENDANT NOTICE OF WHAT 
OFFENSE WAS INTENDED TO BE CHARGED. 
It is a fundamental principle under the Utah 
3ode of Criminal Procedure that every person accused 
}f a crime has the right "to be informed of the 
lature and cause of the accusation." People v. 
iill, 3 Utah 334, 355, 3P. 75 ( ). This infor-
mation must be given with sufficient certainty 
md completeness so that the court may know how 
:o render judgement and the defendant may know 
rtiat he must answer. This common-law principle 
ras codified by the Utah Legislature in Utah Code 
uin. §77-21-8(1), (1953), which states: 
The information or indictment may charge, 
and is valid and sufficient if it charges 
the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted in one or more of the following 
ways: 
(b) By stating, so much of the definition Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
law or of the statute defining the offense 
or in terms of substantially the same meaning/ 
as is sufficient to give the court and the 
defendant notice of what offense is intended 
to be charged. 
The complaint filed against Harris did not meet 
either the common-law or the statutory requirements 
Df certainty and notice. Harris was charged with 
Eorgery under Utah Code Ann. §7 6-26-1. Under this 
statute, one may be convicted of the crime of 
naking the forged instrument, or of uttering as 
genuine an instrument known to be false, or of 
both making and uttering a forged instrument. 
State v^ Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656 (1937). 
In addition, under Utah Code Ann. 76-26-7 (1953), 
an individual may be charged with making, or with 
uttering as genuine, or with both making and utterin( 
fraudulent paper. State v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 
L36 P.2d 949 (1943). Since the simple crime of 
"passing a bad check" may be charged and prosecuted 
inder either of the above statutes, and in any 
Df the ways or combinations of the ways above in-
dicated, an accused person must be informed of 
lis charge with great specificity in order to have 
adeauate notice. In addition, since the* nrpnar^finn 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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f an answer and a defense is contingent upon 
nowing exactly how one is charged, no flexibility 
an be allowed in the form of the complaint if 
.he requirement of certainty and notice is to 
>e met. Finally, since the kind of proof varies 
lepending on the exact charge, the defendant must 
>e adequately informed of the exact charge against 
dm in order to assure a fair trial. 
As demonstrated in Point A, supra., the complain 
.n the instant case was invalid and insufficient 
>n its face. By leaving out the words "uttered 
is genuine" the defendant was unable to know with 
certainty the exact nature of the charge against 
lim. Although the complaint indicated that the 
lefendant was being charged with the general crime 
)f forgery, the confused nature of the crime of 
forgery and the myriad ways in which it can be 
charged and prosecuted require that a specific 
complaint be drawn. As such, the defects on the 
race of the complaint were not cured under Utah 
:ode Ann. §77-21-8 (1) (b), supra., and the complaint 
remains defective. Since such defect goes to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•undamental issue of notice to the defendant, 
_t is contended that the complaint should be held 
roid and insufficient, and the case reversed on 
jrounds of no jurisdiction. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO BE RESENTENCED 
IN ACCORD WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. 
The new Utah Criminal Code became effective 
July 1, 1973, Utah Code Ann. §76-1-102 et seq. 
Prior to that date, petitioner had been tried, 
convicted and sentenced, but his appeal and commit-
ent to prison occured subsequent to the effective 
date. State v. Harris 30 U2d 354, 517 P.2d 1313 
(1974); TR, 2-3. On this basis, petitioner contends 
that his sentencing to the penalty under the re-
pealed code is in error. 
The law in Utah already enables individuals 
charged with criminal offenses which occured prior 
to the effective date of the new Criminal Code 
to be afforded the benefit of the lesser penalties 
under the amendatory statutes. The savings clause 
of the new Utah Criminal Code, Utah Code Ann. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
76-1-103(2), mandates the application of any 
imitation on punishment under the new code where 
he defendant is tried after the effective date. 
The case law in Utah has gone even further 
n determining the applicability of amendatory 
egislation. In State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 
90 P.2d 334 (1971) and Belt v^ Turner, 25 U.2d 
180., 483 P.2d 425 (1971), this Court held that 
rtiere the amended statute became effective prior 
:o the date of sentencing, the amended statute 
controlled the punishment and the defendant was 
entitled to the benefit of the lesser penalty 
ander the new Criminal Code. Thus, even if the 
trial and conviction occur prior to the effective 
date, the amended statute controls the penalty. 
The savings clause, §Utah Code Ann. 76-1-103(2) 
also permits the limitation on punishment under 
the new code to be applicable where the defendant 
is retried after the effective date. Thus, even 
if the trial, conviction and sentence occur prior 
to the effective date, the amended statute controls 
the penalty where the defendant is retried subsequen 
to the effective date. In this regard, the savings 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:lause expands on the holdings of this court in 
State v^ Miller, 24 U. 2d 1, 464 P.2d 844 (1970) , 
is well as State v. Tappand Belt v. Turner, supra. 
En Miller, the court held that the fact that the 
statute under which the defendant was charged 
a^s amended pending appeal did not require the 
:ase to be remanded for resentencing. In Tapp 
Lt was held that.if the statute reducing the penalty 
lad not become effective until after conviction 
ind sentence, the sentence under the repealed 
statute stood. In Belt the court found that where 
:he amendatory statute provides for a lesser penalty 
ind becomes effective subsequent to sentencing 
)ut prior to final judgment, no constitutional 
luestion was involved. 
All three cases are admittedly distinguishable 
from the present case as they were heard by this 
:ourt prior to the effective date of the new criminal 
:ode, including the savings clause provisions, 
[owever, in the recent case of State v. Saxton, 
\0 U.2d 456, 519 P.2d 1340 (1974), this court 
Leld that the defendant, who was tried prior to 
.he effective date of the new code but sentenced 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fter, was entitled to the new, lesser sentence, 
otwithstanding the literal provisions of the 
avings clause. The court thus continued to respect 
he thrust of the new sentencing provisions. 
t follows that where trial, conviction, sentence, 
mposition of sentence, appeal, or retrial occur 
»r are pending subsequent to the effective date 
>f the amendatory legislation, the sentence is 
>r should be that provided in the amended provisions. 
Neither the savings clause nor the applicable 
:ase law expressly address the issue in this case, 
lere, the appeal was pending on the effective 
late of the new code, the judgement of conviction 
tfas subsequently affirmed, and imposition of sentence 
secured after the effective date. Literally read, 
bhe savings clause is applicable in this situation 
Dnly where the defendant is successful on appeal 
and granted a new trial. However, a narrow constru-
ction of the savings clause is both unnecessary 
and unwarranted as demonstrated by this court 
in State v. Saxton, supra., where this court did 
iecline to read narrowly the savings clause here 
at issue. The court expressely rejected the state's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rgument that the language of the savings clause 
perated as a legislative overruling of the holdings 
n State v. Tapp and Belt v. Turner, supra, regarding 
he applicable penalty when sentencing occurs 
fter the effective date: 
The fact that the final "except" clause confers 
further assurance that anyone "tried or retried" 
after the effective date of the act shall 
also have the benefit of a change to a lesser 
penalty, should not be regarded as depriving 
this defendant of the benefit. 30 U.2d at 
459, 419 P.2d at 1342. 
'hus this court has reasonably read into the savings 
ilause rules of law which are not within the scope 
•f its literal reading. The court's intent suggests 
hat application of the amendatory sentencing 
>rovision is both reasonable and appropriate in 
:he facts of this case as well as in Saxton, supra. 
In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964) , 
:he United States Supreme Court held that the ap-
>licability of a savings clause to a repealed 
:riminal statute is a question of interpretation 
>f legislative intent appropriate for determination 
>y the state court. This court, in Belt v. Turner 
15 u.2d 230, 479 P.2d 791 (1971) determined that 
L new policy adopted by the legislature concerning 
)unishment for an offense should inure to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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enefit the defendant, even though the offense 
as been committed prior to the amendatory legislatio 
hus in Utah the judicial position in the case 
f amendatory legislation reducing punishment 
avors lenity. 
In the case of In Re Estrada 48 Cal. Rptr. 
.72, 408 P.2d 948 (1965), the California Supreme 
lourt elaborated upon the legislative intent con-
lerning amendatory penalty provisions: 
There is one consideration of paramount impor-
tance. It leads inevitably to the conclusion 
that the Legislature must have intended, 
and by necessary implication provided, that 
the amendatory statute should prevail. When 
the Legislature amends a statute so as to 
lessem the punishment it has obviously expressly 
determined that its former penalty was too 
severe and that a lighter punishment is 
proper as punishment for the commission of 
the prohibited act. It is an inevitable 
inference that the Legislature must have 
intended that the new statute imposing the 
new lighter penalty now deemed to be suffic-
ient should apply to every case to which 
it constitutionally could apply. The 
amendatory act imposing the lighter punish-
ment can be applied constitutionally to acts 
committed before its passage provided the 
judgment convicting the defendant of the 
act is not final. This intent seems obvious, 
because to hold otherwise would be to conclude 
that the Legislature was motivated by a desire 
for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted 
in view of modern theories of penology. Id, 
48 Cal. Rptr. at 175, 408 P.2d at 951; quoted 
in part in State v. Tapp, supra; cited in 
Belt v. Turner, supra. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JL3 
ach an interpretation is not only in accord with 
egislative intent; it is also consistent with 
ontemporary theories of the criminal sanction. 
This point is elaborated in People v. Oliver, 
51 N.Y.S. 2d 367, 134 N.E. 2d 197 (1956), where 
he lesser penalty of the amended statute was 
pplied to the defendant: 
This application of statutes reducing punish-
ment accords with the best modern theories 
concerning the functions of punishment in 
criminal law. According to these theories, 
the punishment or treatment of criminal ofenders 
is directed toward one or more of three ends: 
(1) to discourage and act as a deterrent 
upon future criminal activity, (2) to confine 
the offender so that he may not harm society 
and (3) to correct and rehabilitate the offender 
There is no place in the scheme for punishment 
for its own sake, the product simply of ven-
geance or retribution, (citations omitted) 
A legislative mitigation of the penalty for 
a particular crime represents a legislative 
judgement that the lesser penalty or the 
different treatment is sufficient to meet 
the legitimate ends of the criminal law. 
Nothing is to be gained by imposing the more 
severe penalty after such a pronouncement; 
the excess in punishment can, by hypothesis, 
serve no purpose other than to satisfy a 
desire for vengeance. As to a mitigation 
of penalties, then, it is safe to assume, 
as the modern rule does, that it was the 
legislative design that the lighter penalty 
should be imposed in all cases that subsequently 
reach the courts. Id, 151 N.Y.S. 2d at 373, 
134 N.E. 2d at 201-2; quoted in Belt v. Turner 
and In Re Estrada, supra. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Common sense and logic dictate tnat wnere, 
.s here, petitioner's appeal was pending on and 
lis commitment to prison occured subsequent to 
:he effective date of the new Utah Criminal Code, 
:he ameliorating penalty provision of the amendatory 
statute applies. It should make no difference 
;o the applicability of the amendatory penalty 
/hether the direct appeal was successful or not 
Ln obtaining a new trial for the defendant. The 
Legislature apparently overlooked the situation 
tfhere the commitment occured subsequent to the 
effective date or where the appeal was pending 
md subsequently lost. Its intent would appear 
bo be however, to afford the lesser penalty in 
such situations, in accord with the preceding 
policy and theoretical considerations. 
The preceding arguments are not novel; the 
:ase law elsewhere has been in substantial agreement 
In Bell v. Maryland, supra the court found that 
tfhere the judgment of conviction has not become 
final, the proceeding is deemed pending. This 
has significance where the amended statute provides 
a lesser penalty. In Commonwealth v. Goodman, 
311 A.2d 652 (1973), the Pennsylvania Supreme Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
inal prior to the adoption of the new act, the 
efendant is entitled to be resentenced under 
he latter act. The finality of a judgment of 
onviction does not vest upon conviction, sentence, 
»r commitment necessarily. The rule, spelled 
•ut, is thus: 
that a judgment is not final until the avail-
ability at appeal has been exhausted and 
the time for petition for certiorari has 
elapsed. Id, 311 A.2d at 6 55, quoted from 
Linkletter v. Walker 381 U.S. 618 (1965) , 
at 622, n.5. 
Thus, under the facts and circumstances of 
:his case, petitioner's judgment of conviction 
ras not final since his appeal was pending on 
:he effective date of the new code and he had 
lot yet been committed. The same position, that 
;he judgment is not final while the case is awaiting 
ippellate review, has been taken by the North 
larolina Court which has held that no subsequent 
mnishment can be imposed under the repealed statute. 
See State v^ Pardon, 272 NC 72, 157 SE2d 698 (1967) , 
:ited in State v. Tapp, supra, this court noting 
:hat Pardon was consistent with the Tapp holding; 
State v^ Godwin, 13 N.C. App. 700, 187 SE2d 400 (1972 
md State v. Hart, 22 N.C. App. 738, 207 SE2d 766 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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74). In accord is Illinois, which has repeatedly 
i that final adjudication has not been reached 
re an appeal of the conviction is pending upon 
effective date of the new legislation, and 
refore that the defendant is entitled to be 
entenced under the new law. See People v. Lucien, 
111. App. 3d 289, 302 NE2d 371 (1973); People 
McCall, 14 111. App. 3d 340, 302 NE2d 400 (1973); 
>ple v^ Marin, 56 111. 2d 490, 309 NE2d 9 (1974); 
iple v. Grant, 57 111. 2d 264, 312 N.E. 2d 276 (1974) 
. People v^ Holiday, 2111. App. 3d 796, 316 NE2d 
i (1974). 
The Nebraska Supreme Court, while in agreement 
Lt the amended statute mitigating punishment 
applicable where the appeal is heard subsequent 
its effective date, has further ruled that 
lishment exceeding the maximum provided in the 
mded act is excessive. See State v. Waldrop, 
L Neb. 434, 215 NW2d 633 (1974); State v. White, 
L Neb. 772, 217 NW2d 916 (1974); State v. Patterson, 
I Neb. 308, 220 NW2d 235 (1974); and State v^ _ 
les, 192 Neb. 548, 222 NW2d 831 (1974). Since 
3 maximum sentence under the controlling section Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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;he new code* UCA 76-6-501(4), is less than 
penalty appellant received under the old code 
vision, UCA 76-26-1, the penalty is excessive 
*r the reasoning of the Nebraska courts. 
The reasoning of In Re Estrada, supra, has 
n followed in California, permitting the defendant 
benefit of the lesser penalty where an appeal 
pending or final judgment had not been rendered 
of the effective date of the amended statute. 
In Re Corcoran, 50 Cal. Rptr. 529, 413 P.2d 
(1966); Bennett v. Procunier, 69 Cal. Rptr. 
, 262 Cal. App 2d, 799, (1968); and People v. 
nstone, 77 Cal. Rptr. 867, 273 Cal. App. 2d, 
(1969). Further, California has extended the 
>licability of the benefit in its most recent 
le where the imposition of sentence occurred 
isequent to the effective date of the new law. 
>ple v. Cloud, 81 Cal. Rptr. 716, 1 Cal App 3d 
.(1969). 
To summarize, many jurisdictions confronted 
;h the applicability question of sentencing 
^visions guarantee the defendant the benefits 
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the lesser penalties. Petitioner's judgment 
conviction was not final in that it was pending 
eal on and he had not been committed to prison 
il subsequent to the effective date of the 
Utah Criminal Code. Therefore, petitioner 
entitled to be resentenced under the amendatory 
.tutes with the benefit of the lesser penalty. 
POINT III 
THE SAVINGS CLAUSE OF THE NEW UTAH CRIMINAL 
CODE OPERATES AS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
OF LAW AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER, AND IS VIO-
LATIVE OF THE UTAH AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Article I, §2, of the Utah Constitution and 
e Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
nstitution contain essentially the same guarantees 
equal protection under the law. The savings 
ause in the new criminal code, UCA §76-1-103(2) 
eates two classes of criminal defendants which 
e not treated alike. Both classes consist of 
irsons who committed their offense prior to the 
ifective date of the amendatory legislation and 
10 had appeals pending from their judgment of 
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/iction at that date. The class of defendants 
:h prevails on appeal and is granted a retrial 
iffbrded the benefit of the lesser penalties 
*r the new code upon reconviction, regardless 
:he grounds for reversal; the other class, 
sisting of those defendants unsuccessful on 
*al, is not afforded this benefit and must 
re the sentence provided by the old penalty• 
3 the applicability in this situation of the 
provisions depends not on when the offense, 
il, conviction, sentence, final judgment, or 
nitment occur, but upon the resolution of the 
sal. Such a construction cannot stand constitu-
lal scrutiny. Petitioner, by not being afforded 
benefit of the lesser penalty under the amendatory 
:ute, is unconstitutionally denied equal pro-
:ion of the law. 
The facts of this case and the language of 
Utah Savings Clause distinguish it from other 
>s where no denial of equal protection has 
1 found in imposing a previously longer sentence 
a crime for which the penalty has been legis-
.vely changed. In those cases attacking the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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;titutionality of savings clauses per se, a 
ing for those attacking them would have established 
:edent or an essentially impossible burden 
:he states to adjust all existing sentences 
iequent to the change. In this case, however, 
Utah legislature did not adopt a wholesale 
.ngs clause, but rather created exceptions 
.ts operation. It thus recognized that, with 
ie exceptions, contemporary penal policy and 
>ry underlying the criminal sanction suggest 
. amendatory lessening of penalties should 
e to the benefits of the defendant even where 
offense is committed prior to the amendatory 
slation becoming effective. While the Utah 
slature should be commended for its progressive 
dpoint, it has, through these exceptions, 
ted petitioner and those similarly situated 
i the protection of the new policy, perhaps 
Istake. The probable legislative intent, 
the constitutional requirement of equal protection 
aw, require that all persons having their 
ment of conviction pending on direct appeal 
he effective date of the new Utah Criminal Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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> be afforded the lesser penalty of the amendatory 
Lslation. This conforms with the legislative 
_cy in the realm of criminal law not to apply 
>s of strict construction, but rather to construe 
law according to the fair import of its terms 
to effect the objectives and purposes of the 
linal sanction: See generally UCA §76-1-106, 
§76-1-104• To the extent that it contravenes 
savings clause, the policy of the Utah legislature 
the constitutional requirement of equal protection 
.aw, Belt v^ Turner 25 U.2d 380, 483 P.2d 425 
'1) must be either modified or overruled. The 
ir Utah case law on this subject is distinguishable 
reasons stated in Point II. 
Petitioner must be resentenced in accord 
L the new Utah Criminal Code, to make constitu-
al the savings clause which has permitted 
state to prosecute persons for offenses under 
old law subsequent to the effective date of 
al; otherwise, under the common law rule enunciated 
ell v. Maryland, supra, all pending criminal 
eedings would have to be dismissed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The vagueness and uncertainty in the language 
the complaint filed against petitioner as to 
t offense with which it was intended that he be 
rged operated as a denial of adequate notice, 
ther, the complaint was insufficient to envoke 
jurisdiction of the court. Under these con-
tions, the complaint being fatally defective, 
itioner's judgment of conviction must be re-
sed and his release ordered. 
When the new Utah Criminal Code became ef-
tive, petitioner's appeal from his conviction 
: pending, and his sentence was not imposed until 
er this court affirmed his conviction. Petitioner 
therefore entitled to be sentenced under the 
visions of the amendatory legislation, either 
ler a theory of legislative intent, case law, and 
.icy regarding the criminal sanction, or under a 
>ory of constitutional mandate by virtue of the 
lal protection clauses of the Utah and United 
ites Constitutions. Under these contentions, 
:itioner's sentence under the old code must be 
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ted and his «case must be remanded for resell-
ing under the new Utah Criminal Code. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. BARNEY GESAS 
Salt Lake County Bar 
Legal Services 
Attorney for petitioner 
Ersell Harris, Jr. 
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